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This paper uses the OECD’s Program for International 
Student Assessment student-level achievement database 
for Mexico to estimate state education production 
functions, controlling for student characteristics, family 
background, home inputs, resources, and institutions. 
The authors take advantage of the state-level variation 
and representative sample to analyze the impact of 
institutional factors such as state accountability systems 
and the role of teachers’ unions in student achievement. 
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They argue that accountability, through increased use 
of state assessments, will improve learning outcomes.  
The authors also cast light on the role of teachers’ 
unions, namely their strength through appointments to 
the school and relations with state governments. The 
analysis shows the importance of good relations between 
states and unions. Furthermore, it demonstrates that 
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Previous research confirms the importance of socioeconomic status on learning and the 
limited role of physical investments (see, for example, World Bank 2005).  It is also expected 
that school climate, expectations, participation, autonomy, accountability and the use of 
assessments will have a significant impact on learning outcomes.  It is also expected that an 
education system that is based on constant assessment and participation in international 
benchmarking exercises will improve its effectiveness.  In most of the countries that performed 
well on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), local authorities and schools have substantial 
responsibility for educational content and/or the use of resources, and many set out to teach 
heterogeneous groups of learners (see, for example, Fuchs and Woessmann 2006). 
 
Mexico has been participating in PISA since its inception in 2000.  This marked a 
significant change in the use of assessments and transparency in Mexico, where results were 
previously not made publicly available.  Mexico’s scores on PISA are below average, but no 
worse than for other countries in Latin America, except for Uruguay in 2003, but in all cases 
Mexico shows a lower level of inequality in test scores than all other Latin American 
participating countries.  For Mexico, there has not been much improvement since PISA 2000.  In 
PISA 2003, Mexico’s performance in all three subjects (mathematics, science and reading) 
declined, though this may be associated with the fact that enrollments increased during the same 
period of time by about 5 percentage points.  The Government of Mexico (2005), the OECD 
(2005), and the World Bank (2005) call for broader use of results to influence policy decisions, 
school management and users’ choice. 
 
In this paper we take advantage of the fact that Mexican data are representative at the 
state level to include more variables at the state level.  This is done in an effort to measure the 
importance of state accountability systems, decentralization and union power on student learning 
outcomes.  The analysis reaffirms the importance of school climate, but also supports the 
contention that further decentralization, school autonomy and assessment are important for 
improving learning outcomes in Mexico.  It also points to the fact that the states are able to align 
their policies to ensure that what works at the local level materializes. Review 
Researchers have begun to use international assessments to analyze the determinants of 
learning.  Hanushek and Luque (2003) indicate that attention to the quality of human capital in 
different countries naturally leads to concerns about how school policies relate to student 
performance.  Using the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the results 
of their analyses of the educational production functions within a range of developed and 
developing countries show general problems with efficiency of resource usage similar to those 
found previously in the United States.  These effects did not appear to be dictated by variations 
related to income level of the country or level of resources in the schools, and the conventional 
view that school resources are relatively more important in poor countries also failed to be 
supported. 
 
At the country level some research using international assessments has appeared.  Fertig 
(2003) used OLS and quantile regressions to analyze the determinants of German students’ 
achievement using PISA 2000.  Among the negative suggested factors were: schools without 
regular tests; too much regulation of schools; poor school conditions; not enough access to 
modern information technology for the students; non-native students; and high student-teacher 
ratio and shortage of teachers.  Fertig and Schmidt (2002) provided, based on the individual-level 
data of the PISA 2000 study, a detailed econometric analysis of the way that reading test scores 
are associated with individual and family background information and with characteristics of the 
school and class of the 15 year old respondents to the survey.  Based on quantile regressions, 
they interpreted the national performance scores, conditional on these observable characteristics, 
as the reflection of different education systems.  Their findings suggest that United States 
students, particularly those in the lower quantiles, are served relatively unsatisfactorily by their 
system of education.  Wolter and Vellacott (2002) analyzed the sibling size and birth-order effect 
on educational achievement in Switzerland on the basis of PISA data.  They show that, besides 
the usual factors like education, wealth or the occupational status of parents, family 
configurations can play an important role in explaining differences between students. 
 
Countries around the world are moving toward increased accountability of schools for 
student performance.  The United Kingdom has an elaborate system of league tables giving 
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The United States has legislated that all states develop an accountability system.  Evidence on 
the impacts of these systems is growing.  United States evidence indicates that strong 
accountability systems lead to better student performance (Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Hanushek and 
Raymond 2005; Jacob 2005).  Less evidence is available about accountability systems in 
developing countries.  This could be due to weak accountability in these countries, along with a 
general lack of systematic measurement and reporting of student achievement. 
 
In an important paper, Woessmann (2003), using TIMSS, suggests that international 
differences in educational institutions explain the large international differences in student 
performance in cognitive achievement tests.  An econometric student-level estimation based on 
data for more than 260,000 students from 39 countries reveals that positive effects on student 
performance stem from centralized examinations and control mechanisms, school autonomy in 
personnel and process decisions, competition from private educational institutions, scrutiny of 
achievement, and teacher influence on teaching methods.  A large influence of teachers’ unions 
on curriculum scope has negative effects on student performance.  The findings imply that 
international differences in student performance are not caused by differences in schooling 
resources but are mainly due to differences in educational institutions.  Taking all countries into 
consideration, he finds that the following factors positively impact science and mathematics 
learning: central examinations; centralized control of curriculum and budget matters; school 
autonomy in process and personnel; teacher incentives; limited influence of unions; scrutiny of 
student performance; parental interest; intermediate level of administration; and competition 
from the private sector.  Fuchs and Woessmann (2006) obtain similar results using PISA 2000.  
In fact, they find that 25 percent of the variation in scores is attributable to institutional variation.  
Student performance is higher with external exams and budget formulation, but also with school 
autonomy in textbook choice, hiring teachers and within-school budget allocations.  School 
autonomy is more beneficial in systems with external exit exams. 
 
  It is argued that teachers’ unions may have a negative impact on learning outcomes 
(Hoxby 1996; Woessmann 2003).  Moreover, in Mexico, the main teachers’ union (Sindicato 
Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, or National Union of Education Workers, or SNTE) 
  3is large, powerful and well organized.  It was established in 1943, interestingly enough by the 
then Secretary of Public Education, Jaime Torres Bodet (Ornelas 1988), who went on to become 
Secretary General of UNESCO from 1948 to 1952.  SNTE was created as a very centralized and 
monopolistic organization, formed from the merger of Union of Education Workers (SUNTE), 
the Mexican Union of Teachers and Education Workers (SMMTE), the Autonomous National 
Union of Education Workers (SNATE), and the Union of Workers of Mexican Education 
(STERM), as well as other smaller groups (Murillo 1999).  While there are other unions, SNTE 
is the largest, with 1.4 million members.  Until 1992 it was affiliated with the longtime 
incumbent Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), serving a political role for a long time, 
especially during elections. Teachers’ demonstrations are frequent occurrences. All public school 
teachers in Mexico belong to a teachers’ union, but not by choice.  While it could play a critical 
role in improving quality, it has so far given priority to raising members’ salaries and expanding 
teaching staff.  Recently the teachers’ union has become more active in political issues, this time 
free of any political party affiliation.  Some argue that the teachers’ unions are a barrier to reform 
and improvement of the education system in Mexico (Ornelas 2004). 
 
Overall union density has gone down in Mexico since 1984, from 30 to 21 percent, and 
this includes teachers (Fairris and Levine 2004).  There was a decline in the proportion of 
education sector workers (not just teachers, but also administrators, secretariat staff, etc.) that are 
unionized, from 73 percent in 1984 to 64 percent in 2000; still, teachers remain the most 
unionized segment of the labor force.   In fact, all public school teachers belong to a union; it is 
mandatory.  This is a higher proportion than Korea (5 percent), Singapore (22 percent), Great 
Britain (60 percent), Spain (63 percent), the United States (68 percent), the Netherlands (80 
percent), Canada (81 percent) and Denmark (95 percent) (Kasten and Fossedal n.d.). 
 
Another measure for union power is the level of conflict that exists between the state and 
the teachers’ union.  Unfortunately, in Mexico there is no official central registry of number of 
days that schools are closed due to strike activity.  In fact, days away from school during strikes 
are not counted as teacher absenteeism.  Conflict could be said to be the result of a lack of 
political alignment due to lack of trust and coordination problems that make negotiations 
difficult.  Conflict between the state and the teachers’ union was used by Murillo and others 
  4(2002) in a study for Argentina.  Conflict is found to have a negative effect on learning outcomes 
in Argentina (Murillo and others 2002).  Adversarial political alignments are associated with a 
decrease in effective numbers of class days, with an indirect negative effect on student 
performance in Argentina.  A recent survey for the Latin America region finds that strike activity 
by Mexican teachers is one of the highest in the region.  Between 1998 and 2003, there were 49 
strikes in Mexico; much more than in Chile (4) or Costa Rica (5), but much less than in 
Argentina (93) or Brazil (90).  The strikes in Mexico led to 434 lost days of schooling throughout 
the country (Gentili and Suarez 2004). 
 
Methodology 
We analyze the determinants of school achievement in Mexico using ordinary and 
generalized least squares.  Factors affecting achievement are analyzed and compared.  In this 
regard ordinary least squares (OLS) methods are used to analyze the determinants of learning.  
The following linear regression model is estimated: 
Y = β1 X1+ β2 X2+ ε    (1) 
where Y is the test score and X1 is a vector of student variables that include household 
characteristics such as socioeconomic indicators, and X2 is a vector of school indicators such as 
school resources, school and institutional features.  It is expected that the scores among students 
in the same schools will be correlated. The reason is that students enrolled in the same school are 
usually more similar to one another in behavior and characteristics than students enrolled in 
different schools.  In other words, one would expect that student performance for given school 
factors would increase in order for those school variables to increase or improve, but one might 
also expect the variation on average school performance to increase as school factors increase or 
improve.  However, because of the non-spherical error term ( ), the OLS 
estimation is not thought to be highly dependable.  The OLS estimate does not account for 
dependency due to clustering effects.  Other OLS estimates take into account the sampling 
procedure, but the correlation between other school characteristics implicit in the survey 
(location, type, level and program) would not be corrected.   In order to accommodate for 
schools fixed effects we use the generalized least squares (GLS) estimation methodology.  To 
) , 0 (
2Ω ≈ σ ε N
  5accommodate the school factors and cover for the between schools and within schools 
dimensions we estimate a combined model: 
ε μ β + + = S X Y 1    (2) 
where X is the predictors’ matrix that also includes the school and institutional variables – which 
are fixed for each student at the same school; S is the predictors matrix that includes student 
variables only; μ  is a random element associated with school disturbances (as a second level 







-1Y, where V is the variance matrix and is equal to ZT
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2 I, and T
d is 
the diagonal matrix for the variance of μ.  Since T and σ
2 are most likely to be unknown we 
estimate their values to fit the parameters by GLS.  For the estimation, iterative generalized least 
squares will be used. 
 
Thus, we use the same basic model as in World Bank (2005), but add new institutional 
variables that were recently collected for each state.  On the modeling of institutional variables in 
education production functions, see Bishop and Woessmann (2004).  This allows us to see how 
state authorities’ actions affect learning outcomes.  More specifically, we use PISA 2003 to 
estimate the determinants of learning outcomes, and take advantage of the fact that the Mexican 
data are representative at the state level and by type of school.  Test scores, household and 
socioeconomic status variables are obtained at the student level, while resources and institutional 
features surrounding students’ learning are measured at the classroom, school and state level. 
 
Data 
The student population in PISA is 15 year-olds, who are thus assessed as they approach 
the end of their compulsory schooling.  For more information about the design, development and 
implementation of PISA, see http://www.pisa.oecd.org.  Mexico was the only country that 
expanded the sample to include state representatives with a random sample of 29,983 students 
chosen from 1124 schools that participated in the assessment from all states (except Michoacan) 
and the Federal District. The survey was carried out in two stages; the explicit stratification was 
based on states and size of the schools, the implicit stratification was based on school type, 
urban/rural, school level and school program. Because the survey comprises three different 
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missing information for some students. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Variables used in the Analysis 
 Mean  s.d. 
Scores    
Math 385.3  80.6 
Science 405.0  76.4 
Reading   399.8  86.5 
Student characteristics    
Town less than 15,000 (%)  0.350   
City less than 1,000,000 (%)  0.499   
City more than 1,000,000 (%)  0.151   
Age (years)  15.80  0.3 
Female 0.500   
Family Background    
Mother with lower secondary complete (%)  0.592   
Mother working (%)  0.350   
Home incentives and inputs    
Homework (hours)  6.9  5.9 
Home educational resources (index)  -0.5  1.2 
Internet (index)  3.1  1.8 
Use of computer at home (index)  3.4  1.5 
School resources    
Motivation in Math (index)  0.6  0.6 
Memorization (index)  0.5  1.0 
Teacher Morale (index)  0.01  1.1 
Sense of belonging to school (index)  0.2  1.0 
Private school (%)  0.6   
Girls in school (%)  0.5    
Source: PISA 2003     
* Using item response theory, PISA mapped performance in each subject on a scale 
with an international mean of 500 test-score points across all OECD countries and an 




We excluded all student observations from the analysis that have a missing value of at 
least one variable.  The learning domains of reading, mathematical and scientific literacy, 
  7together with some other areas such as students’ familiarity with computers, learning strategies, 
and students’ attitudes towards their schools, have been chosen to be the foci of PISA.  PISA’s 
assessment materials focus on young people’s ability to apply their knowledge and skills to real-
life problems and situations, rather than on how much curriculum-based knowledge they possess.  
The emphasis is on whether students, faced with problem situations that might occur in real life, 
are able to analyze, reason and communicate their ideas, arguments or conclusions effectively.  
The term literacy is attached to each domain to reflect the focus on these broader skills.  In the 
way that the term is used, it means much more than the traditional meaning of being able to read 
and write.  The variables used in the analysis are listed in Table 1. 
 
A number of institutional variables were included in the analysis, taking advantage of the 
fact that Mexican data from PISA 2003 are fully representative at the state level.  These new 
variables, therefore, are measured at the state level (Table 2; see also Annex Table 1). 
 









0.50 (0.5) 0-1  State oversight of administrative 
issues has been moved from the state 




0.20 (0.4) 0-1  State has allowed pedagogical 
decision-making to vary by locality 
State evaluation system     1-5  Level of evaluation state implements: 
1
st stage  0.26 (0.4) 1  Only national evaluations 
2
nd stage  0.34 (0.5) 2  States have own tests 
3
rd stage  0.13 (0.3) 3  States disseminate results 
4
th stage  0.20 (0.4) 4  States receive feedback from schools 
5
th stage  0.07 (0.3) 5 
Sates design policy, strategy, 
interventions 
Union power    1-3  Level of teachers’ union influence on 
teacher appointment: 
 0.07  (0.3) 1  Low 
 0.45  (0.5) 2  Medium 
   0.49 (0.5) 3  High 
Conflict    1-3  Level of conflict between state 
government and teachers’ union: 
  0.62 (0.5) 1  No significant conflict 
  0.08 (0.3) 2  Exist conflict 




We introduce variables describing within-state decentralization.  Both are 0-1 dummy 
variables indicating whether or not the decentralization took place.  There are two such variables: 
(1) administrative decentralization—moving state oversight from the state capital to the 
municipal level and (2) pedagogical decentralization—allowing decision making to vary by 
locality (for example, capacity of schools to define training needs, capacity of zone supervisors 
to jointly develop with schools improvement plans, capacity of regional offices to develop 
programs of academic improvement based on test scores).  Such actions, it could be argued, may 
have been allowed in order to put people at the center of service provision since it is believed 
that can go a long way towards improving service delivery.  Focusing on people enables them to 
monitor and discipline service providers and amplifies their voice in policymaking, and 
strengthens the incentives for providers to serve them (World Bank 2004).  The states that have 
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and beneficiaries.  Twenty percent of Mexican states have done this.  By contrast, half of all 
states have decentralized administration within the state. 
 
Accountability systems – student testing, school rankings, school report cards – are 
believed to have a strong impact on improving service delivery, thus making them good 
candidates for improving learning outcomes (see, for example, World Bank 2004).  We 
developed five categories of  state accountability systems: (1) states that rely only on important 
yet sample survey national student assessments carried out by a national agency on behalf of the 
national government (that is, they do not implement, report on or use state-level examinations)—
26 percent have only this; (2) states that do not only rely on national assessments, but implement 
their own examinations of students in their schools (34 percent of states); (3) states that use their 
state-wide assessments systems to inform the public by, for example, disseminating results to the 
school (13 percent); (4) states that received feedback on the results from the schools (20 
percent); and (5) states that use the results and the public feedback to design policies, strategies 
and specific interventions to improve outcomes (7 percent).  The fifth level is what we consider 
the complete or full accountability state system.  It is believed that accountability systems could 
be particularly useful investments if they contribute to improved learning outcomes, especially 
given their extremely low cost (see Hoxby 2002). 
 
In this study, we have information on the power of unions – given that all public school 
teachers are unionized one cannot identify states with and without unions, nor can we in any way 
replicate the seminal study by Hoxby (1996) who used differences in the timing of collective 
bargaining agreements across states in the United States, nor look at the impact of union density 
or fragmentation (as Murillo and others 2002 did for Argentina).  Our information on teacher 
union power ranges from low in terms of influencing the allocation of teacher positions, to 
medium, and high.  High would refer to states where the unions allocate all teachers—this 
characterizes 50 percent of Mexican states; medium refers to states where 50 percent of 
allocations are made by the union and 50 percent through competitive examinations managed by 
state authorities (about 45 percent); and low refers to states where unions allocate less than 50 
percent of teachers (only 7 percent). 
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Another measure for union power is the level of conflict that exists between the state 
authorities and the teachers’ union in that state.  Our conflict variable is constructed through state 
officials contacted in each case by the same person, one of the co-authors of this paper, who 
interviewed state officials and elicited responses to a question about the frequency and 
seriousness of disagreements between state authorities and the section of the union represented in 
the state since 2000.  The conflict variable is categorized as follows: (1) disagreements exist, but 
they are not serious (62 percent of states); (2) the disagreements are frequent but not profound; 
they are manifested in declarations in the mass media (8 percent); and (3) almost every year there 
are profound disagreements; they are manifested in marches, taking over facilities and, in many 
occasions, suspension of school activities (30 percent).  Murillo and others (2002) use a similar 
variable in Argentina.  It also conforms to the situation described in Grindle (2004) and Ornelas 
(n.d.) in terms of union-state relations post-1992 decentralization.  Conflict could be said to be 
the result of a lack of political alignment due to lack of trust and coordination problems that 
make negotiations difficult. 
 
Results 
The full regression results are presented in Annex Tables 2 and 3.  In Annex Table 2 we 
enter each of the institutional state-level variables one at a time.  First, it is shown that further 
decentralization within the state has a positive, but insignificant effect.  Accountability systems – 
student testing, school rankings, school report cards – are shown to have a strong, positive and 
significant impact on learning outcomes.  That is, states that do not rely only on important yet 
sample survey national student assessments have higher scores on PISA, controlling for 
everything else (second stage accountability system).   Further, authorities that use the results of 
their state-wide assessment systems to inform the public, disseminate the results to the school, 
received feedback from users have a significant impact on learning outcomes.  While student 
evaluations at the state level and evaluations systems that disseminate the results back to the 
school have positive and significant impacts, the greatest impact comes from more complete 
systems that non only use the results to inform policy and disseminate results, but also use the 
results to design specific interventions (fifth, or complete accountability stage), have a very large 
impact on learning outcomes.  This makes it a particularly useful investment given its large 
  11contribution to learning outcomes as well as the fact that it is a very cheap investment (see 
below). 
 
In this study, we have information on the power of unions ranging from low in terms of 
influencing the allocation of teacher positions, to medium, and high.  Indeed, in Mexico union 
influence is associated with lower test scores.  In our regression analysis we enter two union 
power variables; both are relative to low union power.  A high influence is not significant.  
However, medium power is significant and has a relatively large negative effect. 
 
Another measure for union power is the level of conflict that exists between the state 
authorities and the teachers union in that state.  The conflict variable takes values of: (1) low—
disagreements exist but they are not serious; (2) medium—disagreements are frequent but not 
profound; and (3) high--almost every year there are profound disagreements manifested in 
marches and suspension of school activities.  Relative to high levels of conflict, only having a 
low level of conflict is significantly and positively associated with learning outcomes. 
 
Full Model 
However, when we include all factors together (Table 3), it turns out that only two of the 
new institutional variables are significant for math: (1) using the state evaluation system to 
feedback to schools and design interventions and (2) conflict between the union and state.  The 
full evaluation-feedback-design (fifth stage) system has the largest impact.  None of the other 
variables are significant.  This is a strong correlation suggesting that states can take significant 
actions to improve their school systems by developing and using an accountability system.  Thus, 
institutions matter, but the most significant institutional issues are relatively low cost and under 
the direct control of state authorities. 
 
This is not to say that unions are unimportant, but relative union power is not a barrier to 
reform when states have the willingness to develop state evaluation systems and engage in 
further decentralization of pedagogical matters.  In some states, interesting experiments are 
taking place to improve quality and efficiency, reflecting successful negotiations with the local 
sections of the teachers’ union (OECD 2005).  The more successful states in terms of academic 
  12achievement, especially PISA scores, are making improvements in the selection of teachers, in 
collaboration with the teachers’ unions in the state. 
 
Table 3: Institutional Effects as Determinants of Student Achievement 
   Math Reading  Science  All 
Institutional factors           
Decentralization within state:         Administrative 0.4   0.0   1.7    0.7  
Pedagogical 3.1    0.6   4.7    2.8  
Accountability:                                      (2nd stage) 2.0   -0.3   0.8    0.8  
 (3rd stage)  -4.4   -1.2   -7.2  *  -4.3 *
(4th stage)  -2.1    -3.9   -5.4  *  -3.8  
 (complete)  14.7 *  12.4 *  6.1    11.1 *
Union influence on teacher positions:      Medium -5.5   -5.4   -4.1    -5.0  
High 1.9    2.0   1.7    1.8  
Conflict between state and union:             Medium 4.6   3.4   6.8  *  6.8 *
Low 9.2 * 9.0 *  9.3  * 9.3 *
Controls for:                         
Student characteristics  incl.   incl.   incl.    incl.  
Family background  incl.   incl.   incl.    incl.  
Home incentives and inputs  incl.   incl.   incl.    incl.  
Log Likelihood  -68,188   -68,349   -68,152    -66,727  
Observations  12,332    12,332    12,332     12,332   
Source: Estimation with GLS using PISA 2003; institutional variables; for full results, see Annex Table 3 
* Denotes significance at the 99% level 
 
  For other subjects the results largely reconfirm the findings presented in the case of math.  
The results for reading are almost identical to those for math.  In the case of science 
accountability systems do not seem to be important and in one case having state testing has a 
negative correlation.  For science outcomes only better relations with the teachers’ union appears 
to be a significant determinant of outcomes.  But when we analyze all subjects together the 
model seems to work.  Having a complete accountability system has a strong correlation with 
overall test scores.  Less conflict between the state and teachers’ union improves overall test 
scores.  Curiously though when we consider all three subjects together union influence on 
teacher positions, which was never a significant variable for any one subject alone, becomes 
significant.  There is a negative correlation between a medium union influence and overall test 
scores.  A high union influence is not significant. 
 
In addition to the previous analysis, we have used quantile regression analysis to estimate 
the differential contribution of the institutional variables along the distribution of student 
  13achievement (Table 4).  Similar to the results from the full model, state authorities that use the 
results of their state-wide assessment systems to build a strong accountability system – inform 
the public, disseminate the results to the schools, and get feedback from users – have a more 
significant impact on learning outcomes of low performing students than for high performing 
students. For the students in the bottom of the distribution of achievement, institutional factors 
have a greater impact on their learning.  Also, a low level of conflict between state authorities 
and the teachers’ union has a significant and positive effect; medium union influence on teacher 
positions has a negative effect.  The effects of these two union-related variables imply that low 
achieving students are vulnerable to union power.  These results also suggest the need for more 
transparent and accountable educational institutions in order to address the needs of 
disadvantaged students, as well as a better relationship between state authorities and the teachers’ 
union. 
 
In order to attempt to address the causality issue, given the non-experimental nature of 
our data, we are using a propensity score matching algorithm that identifies comparable students 
with similar backgrounds, but that differs in terms of exposure to state accountability systems. 
We are using the scores to match students of three similar states, Colima, Guanajuato and 
Tlaxcala. One state has a full accountability system (Colima), another one is at the mid-range of 
such a system (Guanajuato), and one lacks a state evaluation system (Tlaxcala). We have 
analyzed differences in estimated test scores based on exposure to different institutional factors 
at the state level. Annex Table 4 shows that the full accountability model – tests, publication, 
feedback and use for policy and strategy – produces significant differences and positive results. 
Comparing Colima with Tlaxcala, the results show that the latter, a state with a poor 
performance that does not have a full evaluation system, could reach the average level of 
performance among Mexican states if it introduces full accountability. And the comparison 
between Colima and Guanajuato shows that once Guanajuato implements a full accountability 
system, it will be one of the top performing states. Tlaxcala could improve by 0.35 standard 
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Table 4: Institutional Effects as Determinants of Student Math Achievement across the 
Achievement Distribution 
 Quantile 
 Institutional factors  0.20  0.40  0.60  0.80 
Administrative decentralization  -1.7    0.3   0.6    3.8   
Pedagogical decentralization  -0.6     2.1    -1.5    3.2   
Evaluation (2
nd stage)  0.0    1.1   -0.8    4.6  * 
Evaluation (3rd stage)  -6.4    -3.3   -2.1    -2.3   
Evaluation (4th stage)  -1.2     -3.5    -2.4    -4.3   
Evaluation (full accountability)  16.4  * 13.7 *  14.6  *  8.1   
Medium union influence teacher positions  -10.5  * -5.7 **  -9.0  ** 0.2   
High union influence teacher positions  -3.1     0.2    -2.4    4.5   
Medium conflict state and union  4.3    3.6   3.3    3.7   
Low conflict state and union  10.6  * 9.1 *  7.8  *  6.5  * 
Controls for:                         
Student characteristics  incl.   incl.   incl.    incl.  
Family background  incl.   incl.   incl.    incl.  
Home incentives and inputs  incl.   incl.   incl.    incl.  
Pseudo R
2 0.14  0.15   0.15    0.15  
Observations=12,332 -    -    -    -     
Source: Estimation with Quantile Regressions with Bootstrapped SE using PISA 2003; institutional variables; 
full results available upon request 




It is not enough to have low levels of conflict with unions, although it helps.  More 
importantly, paying teachers more will not necessarily reduce conflicts, and there is no evidence 
that it will lead to better learning outcomes (Figure 1).  States with low levels of conflict and 
high teacher wages do very well.  Even better are states that have complete and comprehensive 
accountability systems.  The accountability system for Colima (World Bank 2005), the best 
performing Mexican state, is characterized by all three factors. 











States with educational subsystem
before 1993
Mexico
States with high teacher wages





States with Low conflict - High
Wages




It is interesting to note that a “medium” level of conflict and “medium” level of wages for 
teachers reproduces the exact average PISA score for math in Mexico (Figure 2).  At this average 
level of conflict, the level of salaries is irrelevant for improving outcomes.  Low salaries are not 
associated with good results.  But low levels of conflict with high salaries appear optimal. 
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Towards cost-effectiveness 
 
The national sample-based student assessment run by the National Institute for the 
Evaluation of Education (INEE) is estimated to cost only $US 6 dollars per student (Table 5).  
This compares to other major programs such school-based management which have been 
evaluated to perform well (Gertler, Patrinos and Rubio-Codina 2006; Skoufias and Shapiro 
2006).  It also appears to be a much better investment than other, more expensive, interventions, 
such as high salaries for teachers or more computers.  Many of the more expensive interventions 
are also untried or untested. 
 
 
Table 5: Unit Costs of Selected Mexican Education Programs, 2005 
National Student Assessment    $US 6 
AGEs (Apoyo a la Gestión Escolar, a rural school-based management program   $US 7
State of Aguascalientes Student Assessment   $US 10 
PEC (Programa Escuelas de Calidad, an urban school-based management program   $US 37 
School building   $US 160 
New teachers position and salary increase   $US 240 
Computers (1 per 10 students)   $US 500 
Student assessment as percentage of per pupil spending  0.70%
Note: Calculations made on the basis of a unit cost of $US 1,494 for basic education in 2005 
 
 
To further assess the relative impact of accountability systems at the state level, we use 
the parameters produced in Table 3, and forecast PISA scores in math, controlling for everything 
else, and varying both (a) the level of accountability and (b) the level of conflict between the 
state government and the teachers’ union (Figure 3).  Clearly less conflict between union and 
government will lead to improved scores.  The orders of magnitude are roughly in line with 
increasing levels of accountability up to the fourth stage.  The increase in scores is much higher 
when states have full accountability systems, meaning that they implement their own 
assessments, use the results for policymaking, provide feedback to the schools, and use all that 
information to create strategies and programs. 
 












High Conflict Medium Conflict Low Conflict
First stage Second stage Third stage Fourth stage Fifth stage
 
Level of Government-union conflict 
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the new institutional variables suggests that, in general, more 
accountability (and assessment) is needed to improve learning outcomes.  The analysis confirms 
the importance of continued use of assessments, not only at the national level for benchmarking 
and policy guidance, but also at the state level through universal state systems that provide 
constant feedback to beneficiaries and are used by the authorities to design interventions.   
Therefore, state-level assessments are very important.  While unions will not initiative or initially 
support reform movements to improve the quality of education, they are important partners for 
gaining support for state initiatives.  Much of the variation among states may be due to the 
priorities of governors, their perspectives on the importance of education, and the relationship 
they are able to build with the state teachers’ unions (see also Grindle 2004).  If there were only a 
few things that states could do to improve the quality of education, they would be to implement 
state accountability systems and increase school level autonomy, within a context of positive 
relations with the teachers’ unions that would facilitate incremental reforms in the quality of 
teacher selection. 
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Annex Tabl ns ia
       Within-state  decentraliza




Union conflict  Evaluat her p tions  dmini ative P agogical
Aguascalientes   3  4  1  yes 
ion
Union influence on 
teac osi A str ed
no 
Baja California   yes 
Cam che   2  3  2  yes 
Chiapas   3  3  2  no 
Chihuahua   3  2  1 
Coahuila 2  2  1
Colima  5  1  yes  yes 
Distrito Federal  5  2  yes 
Durango   no 
Guanajuato 3  4  1 yes  yes 
Guerrero 1  1  3  yes 
Hidalgo   2 
Jalisco 3  1  1  yes  no 
México 2  1  1 no 
Morelos  no 
Nayari 2  2  2  no  no 
Nuevo León  3  4  1  yes 
Oaxaca   1  2  3 
Puebla   3  1  2 yes  no 
Querétaro 3  3  1  yes  yes 
Quintana Roo  3  3  1 
San Luis Potosí   3  2  2  no 
Sinaloa 3  2  2  no  no 
Sonora   3  4  2  yes 
Tabasco   2  1  1 
Tam 2  2 no 
Tlaxcala 1  1  3  no  no 
Veracruz   2  2  2  no  no 
Yucatán 3  2  1  no  no 
Zacatecas 2  1  3  no  no 
Note: Baja California Sur and Michoacán were not included in the analysis because of the lack of data 
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